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mbiguity and uncertainty both typify and define federal takings 
law.  Though inherently fact-specific, federal exactions 
jurisprudence often wants for clearly defined rules.  From the 
instruction of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause that no “private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation,”1 the 
U.S. Supreme Court has produced an increasingly prolix body of tests 
and standards in an effort to keep federal takings jurisprudence 
abreast of expanding government regulations on development.  One 
of the most widely debated forms of federal takings law concerns 
exactions of private property by government bodies.2 
An exaction is a form of unconstitutional condition that occurs 
when a government body deprives a private citizen of a 
constitutionally protected right in exchange for a privilege that the 
government body may otherwise deny.3  Classically, an exaction 
occurs if a government body approves development rights on the 
condition that a landowner dedicates private real property for public 
use.  But the U.S. Supreme Court remains silent on how federal 
exactions law applies to obligations imposed as a condition on 
development rights that neither derive from a uniform fee schedule 
nor implicate the real property owned by the party that seeks the 
development right. 
In this void, courts and scholars struggle to reconcile the tension 
between the power of the government to tax private citizens and the 
requirement that private parties receive just compensation when the 
 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
2 See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 451 (Cal. 1996) (noting that “the 
task of making [the] blitz of opinions doctrinally coherent is daunting”); Michael B. Kent, 
Jr., Theoretical Tension and Doctrinal Discord: Analyzing Development Impact Fees as 
Takings, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1833, 1836 (2010). 
3 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 
U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
A
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government takes their physical property.4  This debate now centers 
on two issues: First, whether the federal exactions analysis applies to 
development fees assessed as a condition on development rights.5  
Second, whether the analysis of uniform development fees differs 
from ad hoc development conditions specifically tailored to the 
anticipated impacts of a single development that impact personal 
property rather than a real property interest.6  As development fees 
become an increasingly common component of land-use planning at 
all levels of government,7 these issues present serious implications for 
officials and landowners alike.8 
A recent case out of Oregon, West Linn Corporate Park v. City of 
West Linn, proves illustrative of the need for greater clarity in 
exactions analysis with respect to ad hoc development obligations 
that do not implicate real property interests.  The case began in state 
court and was removed to federal district court.  The parties then 
appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which 
certified several questions to the Oregon Supreme Court before the 
Ninth Circuit eventually decided the case.  Subsequently, the 
petitioner, West Linn Corporate Park, filed a petition for certiorari 
asking the U.S. Supreme Court to address how the exactions analysis 
 
4 See, e.g., McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(speculating that ad hoc monetary obligations may receive a different analysis under 
Dolan than uniform development fees); Daniel L. Siegel, Exactions After Lingle: How 
Basing Nollan and Dolan on the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Limits Their Scope, 
28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 577 (2009); Lauren Reznick, Note, The Death of Nollan and Dolan? 
Challenging the Constitutionality of Monetary Exactions in the Wake of Lingle v. 
Chevron, 87 B.U. L. REV. 725, 756 (2007). 
5 Kent, supra note 2, at 1838.  While there exist subtle differences between 
development fees and impact fees, which may differ based on locale, for the purposes of 
this Note, development fees refers broadly to fees and charges created by statute or 
ordinance and assessed uniformly to all new developments. 
6 Id. at 1838–39. 
7 The ten largest cities in Oregon all require some development fee as part of new 
construction.  See Office of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Decennial Census and American 
Community Survey Results, OREGON.GOV, http://oregon.gov/DAS/OEA/census_and_acs 
.shtml (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).  Oregon law also specifies how cities may impose 
system development fees and development fees.  See generally OR. REV. STAT. §§ 
223.001–223.950 (2011). 
8 Under the federal exactions analysis, the government bears the burden to justify 
conditions imposed on development, whereas landowners must show that a regulatory 
action reaches the level of a per se taking.  Compare Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 
438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978), with Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (explaining that the government 
“must make [an] individualized determination that the required dedication is related both 
in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development”). 
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applies to personal—as opposed to real—property.9  The Supreme 
Court denied certiorari.10 
This Note addresses the Oregon Supreme Court’s opinion 
answering the questions certified from the Ninth Circuit.  In 
particular, it looks to the Oregon Supreme Court’s discussion of when 
and how courts ought to apply exactions analysis to evaluate 
conditions imposed on development rights.11  Part I reviews current 
interpretations of the federal Takings Clause with a focus on the 
present uncertainty regarding the application of Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard to monetary 
obligations and ad hoc conditions imposed on development rights.  
Part II outlines the procedural history of West Linn.  Finally, Part III 
examines how future courts may utilize West Linn to situate ad hoc 
development conditions in the context of federal exactions law.  Part 
III also addresses how courts may usefully clarify the application of 
federal exactions law to ad hoc conditions with greater attention to 
the underlying property interest that the condition impacts. 
First, it is useful to consider the broader landscape of federal 
takings law and to place exactions within that overarching structure of 
law. 
I 
FEDERAL TAKINGS LAW 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the 
government from seizing private land for public use without just 
compensation to a property owner.12  From that premise, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has recognized three general forms of takings: 
physical occupation, regulatory restrictions, and exactions of property 
imposed as a condition of development. 
A.  Physical Takings 
The classic taking occurs when government physically interferes 
with the property rights of a private landowner.  Under the Fifth 
Amendment, any per se taking requires just compensation as a matter 
 
9 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, W. Linn Corporate Park, L.L.C. v. City of W. Linn, 132 
S. Ct. 578 (2011) (No. 11-299). 
10 W. Linn Corporate Park, L.L.C. v. City of W. Linn, 132 S. Ct. 578 (2011). 
11 See W. Linn Corporate Park, LLC v. City of W. Linn (West Linn IV), 349 Or. 58, 240 
P.3d 29 (2010). 
12 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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of course.13  A physical taking may occur in one of four 
circumstances when government action interferes with the right of a 
property owner to exclude others from private property: First, where 
the government directly occupies or appropriates private property for 
a public use;14 second, where government action constructively 
encroaches on real property;15 third, where the government requires 
payment of interest earned in a trust account to benefit a third party;16 
and finally, where the government authorizes or mandates a physical 
invasion of private property.17 
B.  Regulatory Takings 
By contrast, no categorical per se taking occurs if the government 
does not seize physical property.18  But a taking may still occur if a 
government regulation deprives a landowner of the right to utilize 
property in a legally permissible manner, even if the landowner 
knows about the potential restrictions on development.19  In effect, a 
regulatory taking occurs when a government regulation deprives a 
property owner of an anticipated economic opportunity to such a great 
extent that it becomes “functionally equivalent to the classic 
taking.”20  Whether a government regulation reaches this level 
depends on “complex factual assessments of the purposes and 
economic effects of government actions.”21 
Based on that assessment, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council established that a total regulatory taking occurs if a 
 
13 See id.; Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522 (1992). 
14 United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951) (finding that the federal 
government owed just compensation where it physically seized control of a mine to avoid 
a general strike). 
15 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (holding that a physical taking 
occurred where a U.S. military aircraft utilized the airspace above a property owner’s land, 
constructively taking an air easement). 
16 Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 240 (2003); Phillips v. Wash. Legal 
Found., 524 U.S. 156, 170, 172 (1998). 
17 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982) 
(requiring just compensation where a state law authorized entry onto property to install 
cable television facilities and forced private property owners to endure a physical 
occupation of their property). 
18 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
322–23 (2002). 
19 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
20 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005). 
21 Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992). 
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government regulation deprives a landowner of “all economically 
productive or beneficial uses of land” that do not otherwise violate 
state nuisance or property law.22  Even short of a total deprivation of 
all economically viable property uses, a regulatory taking may occur 
if regulations frustrate the “investment-backed expectations” of a 
landowner.23  No bright-line rule determines when a partial taking 
occurs, but in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City the 
U.S. Supreme Court did offer three considerations in the partial 
takings analysis: (1) the scale of the economic impact, (2) the degree 
to which the regulation interferes with investment-backed 
expectations, and (3) the nature of the regulation.24 
C.  Exactions of Property as a Condition on Development Rights 
Finally, exactions are a form of taking that occurs when a 
government body grants a development right that it could otherwise 
deny but does so in exchange for conditions that would constitute a 
taking outside the development context.25  The basic requirements of 
the exactions analysis emerged from the seminal cases of Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard. 
In Nollan, the Supreme Court established that exactions lacking an 
“essential nexus” to the impact of development require just 
compensation.26  In Nollan, a land-use commission approved 
development of a beachfront parcel on the condition that the property 
owners dedicate a strip of the property as an easement to allow public 
access to a nearby park.27  The Court found that the easement lacked 
an essential nexus because it did not address the underlying impact of 
 
22 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029–31 (1992).  In Lucas, a 
developer purchased a beachfront property that he intended to develop into a subdivision.  
Id. at 1008.  After his purchase, the state legislature passed a law that prohibited all 
“occupiable improvements” along a stretch of coast, including the intended subdivision.  
Id. at 1008–09.  Because this legislative action deprived the developer of all “beneficial 
uses” of the property, the Court deemed it a total regulatory taking absent a showing that 
the intended use of the property otherwise violated established nuisance law.  Id. at 1031. 
23 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
24 Id.  In Penn Central, a developer sought to build a fifty-story structure over Grand 
Central Terminal in New York City.  Id. at 115–16.  However, a city ordinance required 
preservation of historical landmarks, including the terminal, id. at 108, 115–16, and the 
city rejected the proposed development, id. at 117.  Because the developer could still use 
the terminal and the city had not rejected all potential development, the Court held that no 
regulatory taking occurred under the partial regulatory takings analysis.  Id. at 136–38. 
25 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005). 
26 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837, 842 (1987). 
27 Id. at 828, 838. 
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the development—limited visual access to the beach.28  As such, the 
Court held that the commission had to provide just compensation if it 
“want[ed] an easement across the Nollans’ property.”29 
Dolan further required “rough proportionality” between the scale 
of an exaction and the scope of the development impact it 
addresses.30  While the Court did not mandate any “precise 
mathematical calculation,” it called for some form of “individualized 
determination” of a development’s anticipated impact to demonstrate 
the connection between a condition imposed and the impact 
addressed.31  In Dolan, the City of Tigard allowed a storeowner to 
build a parking lot on the condition that the storeowner dedicate a 
strip of land for a public bike path to mitigate the anticipated impacts 
of runoff from the lot.32  The Court agreed that the bike path 
possessed an essential nexus to the anticipated runoff, but it found 
that the city failed to establish the rough proportionality of the path 
because the city only asserted that the path “could offset some of the 
traffic demand.”33 
Later, in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, the 
Court clarified that the rough proportionality test from Dolan did not 
extend “beyond the special context of exactions—land-use decisions 
conditioning approval of development on the dedication of property 
to public use.”34  The Court stated that Dolan only addressed whether 
“dedications demanded as conditions of development” fit the 
anticipated impact of development if the dedications themselves 
amounted to an exaction.35  The Court concluded that Nollan and 
Dolan do not apply where the government refuses to allow 
development rather than imposing a condition on development.36 
Finally, in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., the Court declared that 
Nollan and Dolan only addressed the “unconstitutional condition” 
that arose when the government required a property owner to submit 
to a taking in exchange for a discretionary benefit.37  The Court in 
 
28 Id. at 840–42. 
29 Id. at 842. 
30 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391, 396 (1994). 
31 Id. at 391. 
32 Id. at 379–80. 
33 Id. at 395–96. 
34 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999). 
35 Id. at 703. 
36 Id. 
37 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005). 
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Lingle primarily sought to eliminate the “substantially advances” 
language that had infiltrated the takings analysis.38  Still, it had 
occasion to opine that an exactions challenge under Nollan and Dolan 
can only exist where the condition imposed on development would 
otherwise constitute a per se taking if not imposed as a condition on 
development.39 
Lingle did not disturb the holdings in Nollan and Dolan, nor did it 
alter how those cases apply to development conditions.40  Rather, it 
clarified that those cases apply where government predicates 
development rights on a condition otherwise unconstitutional if not 
levied in exchange for the right to develop.  This arguably narrows 
the scope of exactions law41 and limits the application of Nollan and 
Dolan to instances where a development condition would constitute a 
per se taking independent of the development context. 
D.  Monetary Obligations, Ad Hoc Development Conditions, and 
Federal Takings Law 
The Supreme Court has not established precisely when an ad hoc 
development condition amounts to a per se physical taking.  To the 
extent that Supreme Court decisions offer guidance regarding the 
analysis of monetary and ad hoc obligations applied to a specific 
development, the decisions imply that whether the Takings Clause 
applies to government-imposed conditions depends largely on the 
specific property interest impacted. 
For example, a uniformly assessed monetary obligation may 
nonetheless constitute a physical taking if the impact of the 
government action proves sufficiently discrete and specific.42  In 
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, the Supreme Court 
analyzed a state law that required payment of interest generated in 
lawyer trust accounts to a nonprofit corporation.43  The Court 
determined that the interest amounted to physical property under the 
 
38 Id. at 544–45 (concluding that the “substantially advances” test for takings 
improperly conflates a takings analysis with a due process test of the underlying policy 
reasons that justify government action) (overruling Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 
(1980)). 
39 Id. at 547. 
40 Id. at 545. 
41 See Siegel, supra note 4, at 609 (recognizing that Lingle narrows the applicability of 
Nollan and Dolan to adjudicative decisions). 
42 Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 170, 172 (1998). 
43 Id. at 162. 
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Takings Clause because “property” for the purposes of a takings 
analysis involved more than economic value and included the right to 
possess, control, and dispose of property.44  Yet the Court declined to 
reach the issue of whether a physical taking occurred.45 
Later, in Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, the Court held 
that dedications of interest accrued in lawyer trust accounts may 
amount to a per se taking because they implicate a sufficiently 
discrete property interest—the specific funds located in an account 
subject to the required payments.46  The Court ultimately concluded 
that no compensation was owed because the interest accrued by the 
owners of the accounts had not originally belonged to them.47  As 
such, the owners had not actually lost any money as a result of the 
dedications.48 
In contrast, the Court has declined to consider monetary 
obligations to be physical takings when the obligations at issue 
applied broadly and did not target specific funds.49  In Eastern 
Enterprises v. Apfel, the Court considered retirement premiums 
imposed on coal producers by provisions of the Coal Act.50  In a 
closely divided decision, a plurality held that excessive fees imposed 
on mining companies violated the Due Process Clause but did not rise 
to the level of a per se taking because they did not apply to a specific 
property interest.  Likely casting the deciding vote on the takings 
issue, Justice Kennedy emphasized that the manner in which 
government action impacts a specific property interest dictates 
application of the Takings Clause.51  Although the monetary burden 
imposed by the Coal Act effectively equaled an actual taking of 
physical property, it neither “target[ed] a specific property interest nor 
depend[ed] upon any particular property for the operation of its 
statutory mechanisms.”52  As such, Justice Kennedy concluded that it 
did not implicate the underlying concern of the Takings Clause: 
obligations related to a specific property interest.53 
 
44 Id. at 170. 
45 Id. at 172. 
46 Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003). 
47 Id. at 240–41. 
48 Id. 
49 See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998). 
50 Id. at 517–19. 
51 Id. at 543 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 544. 
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Absent more definitive guidance from the Supreme Court, federal 
and state courts approach a consensus that Nollan and Dolan do not 
apply to uniformly assessed development fees.  But the rationales of 
different courts vary widely, and courts remain ambivalent about the 
proper way to analyze ad hoc conditions on development rights.  
While not exhaustive, the following summary captures the indecision 
that currently plagues exactions law. 
1.  Interpretations of Nollan and Dolan in Federal Courts 
In the aftermath of Lingle, federal courts have generally agreed that 
Dolan does not apply to uniform development fees imposed as part of 
a comprehensive fee schedule.  For example, the Eleventh Circuit 
observed that “the takings analysis is not an appropriate vehicle to 
challenge the power of [a legislature] to impose a mere monetary 
obligation without regard to an identifiable property interest.”54  The 
Sixth Circuit noted that “all circuits that have addressed the issue [of 
monetary obligations] have uniformly found that a taking does not 
occur when the statute in question imposes a monetary assessment 
that does not affect a specific interest in property.”55 
But the lingering question of what qualifies as a “specific interest 
in property” leaves courts hesitant to announce how Nollan and Dolan 
apply to those ad hoc conditions on development rights that apply to a 
single landowner and a discrete property interest.  In McClung v. City 
of Sumner, the Ninth Circuit held that a “generally applicable 
development condition” imposed in exchange for development rights 
did not amount to a per se taking under the Takings Clause.56  But it 
also emphasized that the development condition applied to “all new 
developments,” which set it apart from obligations imposed in 
exchange for approval of a specific permit.57 
Despite suggestions that the analysis of ad hoc obligations may 
differ from an analysis of uniform development fees, federal courts 
have hesitated to address how Nollan and Dolan apply to ad hoc 
development conditions.  The same holds true among state courts. 
 
54 Swisher Int’l, Inc. v. Schafer, 550 F.3d 1046, 1056 (11th Cir. 2008). 
55 McCarthy v. City of Cleveland, 626 F.3d 280, 285 (6th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added). 
56 McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 1225, 1227 (9th Cir. 2008) (refusing to 
consider a development condition under Dolan where the matter did not involve an ad hoc 
adjudicative decision). 
57 Id. at 1228 (citing United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 n.9 (1989)). 
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2.  Federal Exactions Law in State Courts 
Prior to Lingle, some state courts applied Dolan to fees assessed in 
exchange for development rights.58  For example, in Ehrlich v. City of 
Culver City, the California Supreme Court determined that “when a 
local government imposes . . . discretionary permit conditions on 
development by individual property owners . . . Nollan and Dolan 
require that such conditions, whether they consist of possessory 
dedications or monetary exactions, be scrutinized under the 
heightened standard.”59  In that case, Culver City imposed a fee on a 
landowner in exchange for the authorization to construct a new office 
building.60 
After Lingle, state courts increasingly distinguish between money 
taken under the power to tax and property appropriated for public use 
under eminent domain.  However, they have done so for different 
reasons.  In Illinois, a court upheld a surcharge on casino profits that 
exceeded a certain annual amount, explaining that “the takings 
clauses of the federal and state constitutions apply only to the state’s 
exercise of eminent domain and not to the state’s power of 
taxation.”61  Conversely, a Colorado court held that drainage fees 
imposed on all developers did not constitute an exaction that merited 
compensation under the Nollan/Dolan standard because the fee 
applied to all who sought to develop and not just “one landowner and 
one parcel of land.”62 
Yet state courts have primarily addressed development fees derived 
from a uniform fee schedule.  They remain ambivalent about the 
proper classification of ad hoc obligations imposed on a single 
landowner in exchange for a specific development right. 
 
58 See, e.g., Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 
639–40 (Tex. 2004) (concluding that Dolan applies to both “a dedication of property to the 
public and a requirement that property already owned by the public be improved”); see 
also BHA Invs., Inc. v. City of Boise, 108 P.3d 315, 319 (Idaho 2004) (“Money is clearly 
property that may not be taken for public use without the payment of just compensation.” 
(citing Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003))). 
59 Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 447 (Cal. 1996). 
60 Id. at 435. 
61 Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Giannoulias, 896 N.E.2d 277, 291 (Ill. 2008). 
62 Wolf Ranch, LLC v. City of Colo. Springs, 207 P.3d 875, 881 (Colo. 2008). 
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3.  Federal Exactions Law in Oregon 
In the aftermath of Dolan, the Oregon Court of Appeals heard a 
case involving an ad hoc development condition that combined 
elements of a physical taking and a monetary obligation.  In Clark v. 
City of Albany, a condition specifically tailored to ameliorate the 
impact of a planned restaurant required the developers “to make road 
improvements on and extending beyond the affected property.”63  The 
court characterized the condition as an exaction, holding that there is 
little difference between requiring a developer to “convey title to the 
part of the property that is to serve a public purpose” and requiring a 
developer to “make improvements on the affected and nearby 
property and make it available for the same purpose.”64 
Yet less than a decade later, the Oregon Court of Appeals 
considered Clark “open to question.”65  Considering federal takings 
law, the court held in Dudek v. Umatilla County that “money is not 
the equivalent of real property under the Takings Clause such that a 
requirement to pay money should be treated as though it were a 
physical occupation or exaction of real property.”66  Finally, the 
Court of Appeals held in Rogers Machinery, Inc. v. Washington 
County that development or impact fees do not implicate the 
exactions analysis because such fees apply broadly to all who intend 
to develop and fall under the taxing power of the state.67 
But both Dudek and Rogers Machinery involved uniformly 
assessed development fees, and Clark concerned dedications of real 
property owned by the landowner.  By contrast, the exactions claim in 
West Linn involved only off-site improvements tailored to address 
impacts of a specific development.68  Such conditions defy ready 
classification as a uniform development fee or a classic physical 
taking. 
 
63 Clark v. City of Albany, 137 Or. App. 293, 299, 904 P.2d 185, 189 (1995), review 
denied, 322 Or. 644 (1996). 
64 Id. at 300, 904 P.2d at 189. 
65 Dudek v. Umatilla Cnty., 187 Or. App. 504, 516 n.10, 69 P.3d 751, 758 n.10 (2003) 
(noting that Del Monte Dunes cautioned against use of Nollan and Dolan outside “land-use 
decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication of property to public 
use”). 
66 Id. at 515 n.9, 69 P.3d at 758 n.9. 
67 Rogers Mach., Inc. v. Wash. Cnty., 181 Or. App. 369, 395, 45 P.3d 966, 980 (2002), 
review denied, 334 Or. 492 (2002). 
68 West Linn IV, 349 Or. 58, 61, 240 P.3d 29, 30 (2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 578 
(2011). 
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II 
WEST LINN CORPORATE PARK, LLC V. CITY OF WEST LINN 
Protracted and suffering from “paucity of agreed material facts,”69 
West Linn arose innocuously enough from the construction of the 
West Linn Corporate Park (WLCP) in the City of West Linn, 
Oregon.70  As part of the initial consideration of the development, the 
City conducted a traffic study to assess any impacts the development 
may have on the surrounding area.71  Based on the study, the City 
approved the project early in 1998, on the condition that WLCP 
complete several off-site improvements.72  This required WLCP to 
upgrade and widen streets, improve waterlines, install traffic signals, 
construct sidewalks, and create a bike path.73 
Construction of the improvements began in 1998, and the 
relationship between the City and WLCP soured as the project 
progressed.  First, a city ordinance vacated an intersection adjacent to 
the development site and subsequently recorded an easement for a 
bike path through the intersection.74  The City then refused to release 
the bonds secured by WLCP for its off-site improvements because, it 
claimed, WLCP failed to complete the improvements as required.75  
Soon after construction concluded in 2000, WLCP filed suit against 
the City in Oregon circuit court.76  The City then removed the matter 
to federal district court.77 
In its court filings, WLCP asserted nine claims for relief under 
state and federal law.78  These included exactions claims based on the 
off-site improvements, an unjust enrichment claim, a takings 
challenge based on vacation of the abutting intersection and 
 
69 W. Linn Corporate Park, LLC v. City of W. Linn (West Linn I), No. Civ. 01-1787-AS 
(D. Or. Aug. 6, 2004), 2004 WL 1774543, at *1. 
70 Id. at *2. 
71 Id. at *3.  The city argued that the study established the conditions of approval for the 
office park; the developer claimed that the survey simply estimated the traffic that 
development might affect. 
72 Id. at *4. 
73 Id. at *5; W. Linn Corporate Park, L.L.C. v. City of W. Linn (West Linn II), 534 F.3d 
1091, 1095–96 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Plaintiff’s Trial Memorandum at 3–4, West Linn I, 
No. 01-1787-AS (D. Or. Aug. 23, 2004), 2004 WL 1774543. 
74 West Linn I, 2004 WL 1774543, at *8. 
75 Id. at *7. 
76 West Linn II, 534 F.3d at 1093. 
77 Id. 
78 West Linn I, 2004 WL 1774543, at *1. 
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subsequent easement, two claimed violations of civil rights, an equal 
protection claim, and a challenge to a prior zoning agreement.  This 
Note focuses on the federal exactions claim based on the off-site 
improvements required by the City.  A summary of the arguments 
advanced by the parties in the district court and the Ninth Circuit 
provides context to the questions addressed by the Oregon Supreme 
Court. 
A.  District Court of Oregon 
For its part, WLCP asserted that Nollan and Dolan applied to the 
off-site improvements because the improvements amounted to a 
taking of private property.  It alleged that the required improvements 
violated Dolan because the City failed to assess rough proportionality 
in its initial traffic survey.79  It also claimed that the off-site 
improvements lacked the rough proportionality required by Dolan 
because the City had also imposed development fees that “fully 
capture[d] all impacts from the development.”80 
Meanwhile, the City began to build what would become its theory 
on appeal: that neither Nollan nor Dolan applied because only the 
taking of real property can give rise to an exactions claim.81  Under 
the view espoused by the City, no exaction occurred because WLCP 
“did not own, possess, or have any interest in the developed real 
property at the time of any alleged taking or at the time the conditions 
were imposed.”82 
In response, WLCP cited Clark v. City of Albany to support the 
proposition that Dolan extends to “conditions of approval requiring 
developers to construct public improvements.”83  It also argued that 
Del Monte Dunes did not apply because that case involved the total 
denial of development rights, as opposed to the conditional right to 
develop granted in West Linn.  While WLCP admitted that “it is not 
possible to use the Dolan test” where no exaction occurs, WLCP 
 
79 Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Amended Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment at 9–12, West Linn I, No. 01-1787-AS (D. Or. Jan. 20, 2004), 2004 WL 
1774543. 
80 Plaintiff’s Trial Memorandum, supra note 73, at 3, 8. 
81 Combined Answering Brief and Reply Brief of Defendants-Appellants Cross-
Appellees City of West Linn and Boris Piatski at 25, West Linn II, 534 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 
2008) (Nos. 05-36061, 05-36062). 
82 Answer to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 2, West Linn I, No. 01-1787-AS (D. Or. 
Aug. 18, 2004), 2004 WL 1774543. 
83 Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 27, West Linn 
I, No. 01-1787-AS (D. Or. Feb. 3, 2004), 2004 WL 1774543. 
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maintained that the off-site conditions gave rise to an exaction 
because “the payment of money is analyzed as a physical . . . 
taking,”84 and money represents “private property” for the purposes 
of the Fifth Amendment.85  Thus, it claimed, “takings occurred on the 
dates that WLCP constructed the improvements that the City 
demanded.”86 
After the district court declined to grant summary judgment for 
either party on the exactions claim,87 the parties proceeded to trial.  
At trial, the district court found in favor of the City on the exaction 
issue and in favor of WLCP on several other claims.88  Both WLCP 
and the City appealed to the Ninth Circuit.89 
B.  Ninth Circuit, Part I 
In the time between the trial and the appeal, the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided Lingle.  The briefs from both parties attempted to 
grapple with Lingle’s proclamation that Nollan and Dolan only 
applied to “unconstitutional conditions.”  The arguments of the parties 
focused on two central issues: (1) whether Nollan and Dolan applied 
to regulatory or physical takings, and (2) whether an ad hoc 
development condition of any kind could amount to a per se physical 
taking. 
In its opening brief, WLCP claimed, “[T]he trial court 
misconstrued . . . relevant United States Supreme Court and Oregon 
appellate cases, when it ruled that the development conditions 
imposed by the City should be treated as a mere ‘regulatory 
taking.’”90  It also argued that the district court improperly construed 
exactions as regulatory takings rather than “physical appropriation[s] 
of property.”91  This proved critical because it deprived WLCP of its 
 
84 Id. at 28 (citing Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003)). 
85 Id. at 29 (citing Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998)). 
86 Id. at 9. 
87 West Linn I, 2004 WL 1774543, at *13. 
88 West Linn II, 534 F.3d 1091, 1093 (9th Cir. 2008); Brief of Defendants-Appellants 
Cross Appellees’ City of West Linn and Boris Piatski at 2, West Linn II, 534 F.3d 1091 
(9th Cir. 2008) (Nos. 05-36061, 05-36062). 
89 Combined Opening Brief and Answering Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
West Linn Corporate Park, LLC at 14, West Linn II, 534 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2008) (Nos. 
05-36061, 05-36062). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 31. 
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“categorical right to just compensation” for a physical taking.92  
WLCP then reiterated its argument that “the taking of money for a 
public purpose constitutes a per se physical taking.”93  It cited several 
state and federal decisions to that effect, but none decided in the short 
time after Lingle.94 
In response, the City characterized the off-site improvements as 
“part of the City’s SDC system” and posited that WLCP had used 
those improvements to satisfy “generally applicable SDCs imposed 
on the development.”95  The City did not necessarily disagree that the 
off-site improvements required WLCP to incur certain costs,96 but it 
argued that the improvements were not subject to Nollan and Dolan 
because they did “not fit within the . . . definition of a ‘physical 
taking.’”97  The City also asserted that WLCP’s federal exactions 
claims lacked ripeness because WLCP failed to seek just 
compensation through available remedies under state law.98 
After considering the arguments of both parties, the Ninth Circuit 
determined that it could not reach the merits of the federal exactions 
claims because it needed to “resolve the[] state-law causes of action 
before reaching the merits of the federal takings arguments.”99  The 
court also expressed doubts about how to analyze the off-site 
improvements under exactions law and the validity of the vacation of 
the abutting intersection that gave rise to WLCP’s other takings 
claim.100  To address these concerns, the court stayed the proceedings 
and certified three questions to the Oregon Supreme Court:101 
 
92 Id. at 23.  WLCP contrasted this “categorical right” with the regulatory takings 
analysis that depends on “the character of the governmental regulation, its economic effect 
on the landowner, the extent to which it interferes with reasonable investment-based 
expectations and/or whether it deprives the owner of all economically [sic] or productive 
use of the land.”  Id. at 23–24 (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 
(2001)). 
93 Id. at 26. 
94 Id. at 25 (citing Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996); Town of 
Flower Mound v. Stafford Estate Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2004); Benchmark 
Land Co. v. City of Battleground, 972 P.2d 944 (Wash. 1999)). 
95 Combined Answering Brief and Reply Brief of Defendants-Appellants Cross-
Appellees City of West Linn and Boris Piatski at 27, West Linn II, 534 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 
2008) (Nos. 05-36061, 05-36062). 
96 Id. at 23. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 18–23. 
99 West Linn II, 534 F.3d at 1093 (citing Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. 
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)). 
100 Id. at 1104. 
101 Id. at 1105–06. 
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(1) Must a landowner alleging that a condition of development 
amounts to an exaction or physical taking exhaust available 
local remedies before bringing his claim of inverse 
condemnation in an Oregon state court? 
(2) Can a condition of development that requires a landowner to 
improve off-site public property in which the landowner has no 
property interest constitute an exaction? 
(3) Under Or. Rev. Stat. § 271.120, is a City Council’s purported 
vacation of a street ultra vires when the petition for vacation 
does not comply with the landowner consent provisions of Or. 
Rev. Stat. § 271.120?102 
The Ninth Circuit authorized the Oregon court to consider any issues 
that would aid in the interpretation of the law.103  This Note analyzes 
the second question. 
C.  Oregon Supreme Court 
In 2008, the Oregon Supreme Court accepted the questions 
certified from the Ninth Circuit.104  In responding to the Ninth 
Circuit, the Oregon court first addressed the issue of administrative 
exhaustion for a claim of inverse condemnation under Oregon law.  
The court found no “significant difference between takings claims . . . 
based on regulations that limit the use of property and those that are 
based on regulations that place conditions on its development.”105  
Thus, the court concluded that Oregon law required property owners 
to pursue local administrative remedies before bringing an inverse 
condemnation claim or a challenge to a condition on development, 
but it did not require exhaustion of all state remedies.106  This 
rendered WLCP’s claim ripe for review and relief. 
Having deemed the exactions issue ripe for review, the court 
considered how Dolan would apply if the government conditioned 
development rights on a requirement that a “property owner construct 
off-site improvements.”107  The court disagreed with WLCP’s 
argument that Clark v. City of Albany precluded consideration of ad 
hoc development conditions, and refused to follow “a Court of 
 
102 Id. at 1105. 
103 Id. at 1105–06. 
104 W. Linn Corporate Park, LLC v. City of W. Linn (West Linn III), 345 Or. 461, 200 
P.3d 147 (2008) (reported in table). 
105 West Linn IV, 349 Or. 58, 75, 240 P.3d 29, 38 (2010). 
106 Id. at 76, 240 P.3d at 39. 
107 Id. at 87, 240 P.3d at 45. 
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Appeals case that predated Lingle.”108  Thus, despite objections by 
the dissent that the court lacked authority to opine on federal law, the 
court decided to address both the state and federal exactions 
claims.109  The court opted to consider the federal claims first—a 
departure from its usual practice to consider state takings law before 
federal claims—because WLCP relied on federal takings law as the 
“theoretical basis” for all of its exactions claims.110 
Accepting that Lingle limits the scope of Nollan and Dolan to 
unconstitutional conditions imposed in exchange for a discretionary 
right, the court considered whether the off-site improvements 
independently constituted a per se taking.111  The court focused its 
inquiry on the authority under which the City required the off-site 
improvements, noting that the power of eminent domain does not 
enable government to compel a party to construct improvements or to 
spend money.112  “It does not make sense,” the court emphasized, “to 
say that, although government has the power to impose a monetary 
obligation, it must repay the value received as just compensation.”113 
That said, the court reasoned that when a landowner pays a 
development fee “it does not relinquish existing property”; it merely 
“fulfills a newly imposed monetary obligation.”114  It distinguished 
these “new monetary obligations” from the “seizure of a discrete 
monetary fund” at issue in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation 
and Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington.115  From this 
conclusion, the court decided that absent a U.S. Supreme Court 
decision to the contrary, “a government’s requirement that a property 
owner undertake a monetary obligation that is not roughly 
proportional to the impacts of its development does not constitute an 
unconstitutional condition under Nollan/Dolan or a taking under the 
 
108 Id. at 82, 240 P.3d at 42. 
109 Writing for the dissent, Justice Kistler, joined by Justice Linder, urged that Oregon 
law did not allow the court to answer “whether [a] property owner would win or lose on its 
substantive federal claim” in an Oregon court.  Id. at 105, 240 P.3d at 55 (Kistler, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
110 Id. at 77, 240 P.3d at 40 (majority opinion). 
111 Id. at 81, 84–85, 240 P.3d at 41, 43–44 (citing Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford 
Estates P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2004)) (dismissing the view that Nollan and Dolan 
do not apply to unconstitutional conditions). 
112 Id. at 87, 240 P.3d at 45. 
113 Id. at 93, 240 P.3d at 48–49. 
114 Id. at 85, 240 P.3d at 44. 
115 Id. at 93 n.22, 240 P.3d at 48 n.22. 
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Fifth Amendment, nor does it require payment of just 
compensation.”116 
The court concluded that requiring off-site improvements 
constituted the “functional equivalent of the imposition of a monetary 
obligation” because the government could accomplish the same end if 
it assessed a fee with which the government could construct 
improvements.117 
However, the court opined that excessive ad hoc conditions on 
development rights could prove unconstitutional in two 
circumstances.  First, a monetary obligation might fail for reasons of 
due process if it lacks a reasonable relationship to the impacts of 
development.118  Second, an obligation may prove sufficiently 
onerous to require partial compensation based on Penn Central or full 
compensation under Lucas.119  Indeed, burdens on development that 
amount to regulatory takings “require payment of just compensation 
without further inquiry.”120 
As for the remaining takings claims, the court found that the 
Oregon Constitution did not require any compensation for the off-site 
improvements because they did not deprive WLCP “of all 
economically viable use of the land.”121  It also determined that the 
City validly vacated the intersection abutting the development before 
the City recorded its easement through that land.122 
D.  Ninth Circuit, Part II 
Based on the Oregon Supreme Court opinion, the Ninth Circuit 
rejected WLCP’s exactions claims under both article I, section 18 of 
the Oregon Constitution as well as the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.  The Ninth Circuit recognized that “[t]he Supreme Court 
has not extended Nollan and Dolan beyond situations in which the 
government requires a dedication of private real property.”123  Absent 
further comment from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit refused 
 
116 Id. at 86, 240 P.3d at 45. 
117 Id. at 86–87, 240 P.3d at 45. 
118 Id. at 87–88, 240 P.3d at 45–46. 
119 Id. at 85–86, 240 P.3d at 44–45. 
120 Id. at 86, 240 P.3d at 44. 
121 Id. at 93, 240 P.3d at 49. 
122 Id. at 101, 240 P.3d at 53. 
123 W. Linn Corporate Park, LLC v. City of W. Linn (West Linn V), 428 F. App’x 700, 
702 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 578 (2011). 
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to apply the Nollan/Dolan test to the off-site improvements.  But the 
Ninth Circuit did not elaborate on the analysis of federal exactions 
law offered by the Oregon Supreme Court. 
Shortly after the decision of the Ninth Circuit, WLCP filed a 
petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.124  The Supreme 
Court denied the petition in November 2011.125 
III 
THE IMPACT OF WEST LINN AND THE AMBIGUITY OF FUNCTIONAL 
EQUIVALENCY 
The impact of West Linn hinges on many factors beyond the text of 
the decision itself.  For example, future Oregon courts may question 
the precedential value of the opinion.126  As noted by the dissent in 
the Oregon Supreme Court, the questions certified from the Ninth 
Circuit potentially “ask[ed] for more” than Oregon law allows the 
court to announce.127  Future courts may consider any answers to 
those questions dicta.  Moreover, the Ninth Circuit offered its own 
brief analysis of the federal exactions claims, simply declining to 
extend Nollan and Dolan to cover monetary exactions absent further 
clarification from the U.S. Supreme Court.  The subsequent denial of 
certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court leaves uncertain the precedential 
effect of the Ninth Circuit’s ambivalence. 
Still, West Linn suggests a possible direction for future exactions 
decisions by Oregon courts and offers insight into the classification of 
monetary obligations—and more general ad hoc conditions on 
development rights—in the context of federal exactions law.  Yet its 
analysis overlooks the proper inquiry to determine whether Nollan 
and Dolan apply to a condition on the right to develop: the specificity 
of the property interest implicated by the obligation. 
 
124 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, West Linn II, 534 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 11-
299). 
125 W. Linn Corporate Park, L.L.C. v. City of W. Linn, 132 S. Ct. 578 (2011). 
126 The Oregon Supreme Court has considered responses to certified questions as 
precedent.  See, e.g., McGanty v. Staudenraus, 321 Or. 532, 552, 901 P.2d 841, 853–54 
(1995) (discussing Bratcher v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 308 Or. 501, 783 P.2d 4 (1989)).  But those 
certified questions did not involve matters of federal law.  See Bratcher, 308 Or. at 503–
04, 783 P.2d at 4–5. 
127 West Linn IV, 349 Or. at 103, 240 P.3d at 54 (Kistler, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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A.  Establishing the Boundaries of Nollan and Dolan 
Unless a condition imposed by government on the right to develop 
amounts to a per se taking, it should not receive scrutiny under Nollan 
and Dolan.  To that end, the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court to 
categorize monetary obligations as regulatory actions coheres with the 
position of the U.S. Supreme Court in Lingle and follows the trend of 
state and federal courts in the wake of that decision.  Such an 
approach also comports with scholarship cited in West Linn 
suggesting that Lingle places development fees and impact fees 
beyond the scope of Nollan and Dolan.128 
Under current federal takings law, a government seizure of real 
property necessarily results in an unconstitutional taking.  Yet 
regulatory actions only become unconstitutional if they are 
“functionally equivalent” to a physical taking as determined by 
“complex factual assessments of the purposes and economic effects of 
government actions.”129  Ad hoc conditions on development do not fit 
neatly into either of these categories.  For example, a development fee 
closely resembles a tax, which government may constitutionally 
assess under its regulatory power.130  However, monetary obligations 
differ from classic regulatory takings, which often involve decisions 
related to policy that peripherally impact a landowner’s expectancy 
interests.  And both Phillips and Brown support that a monetary 
obligation may actually constitute a taking of a private property 
interest if it directly involves a specific, preexisting pool of funds.131 
Ultimately, the decision to classify monetary obligations as a 
matter of regulatory action best coheres with current exactions law.  
Lingle establishes that Nollan and Dolan apply to unconstitutional 
conditions imposed in exchange for a discretionary privilege.132  
While a per se taking proves unconstitutional on its face,133 a 
regulatory taking provides no “categorical” right to compensation 
unless it amounts to a total or partial taking under Penn Central or 
 
128 Id. at 85, 240 P.3d at 44 (majority opinion); see Siegel, supra note 4. 
129 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005); Yee v. City of Escondido, 
Cal., 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992). 
130 West Linn IV, 349 Or. at 93–94, 240 P.3d at 48–49. 
131 See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 170, 172 (1998); Brown v. Legal 
Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 222–23, 240 (2003). 
132 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547–48. 
133 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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Lucas.134  Thus, a regulatory action only receives an exactions 
analysis if it amounts to the functional equivalent of a per se taking.  
But if a landowner can establish that a full or partial regulatory taking 
occurred, compensation follows as a matter of course and does not 
require further proof that a government body imposed the condition at 
issue in exchange for a right to develop.135  As a practical matter then, 
Nollan and Dolan do not apply to monetary conditions imposed on 
development rights unless the property interest implicated amounts to 
the functional equivalent of a physical taking based on the specificity 
of the monetary interest impacted. 
Second, the decision to exclude the off-site improvements from the 
Nollan and Dolan analysis preserves the evidentiary balance between 
government and private landowners.  Under a regulatory takings 
analysis, landowners bear the burden to show that a government 
action merits compensation based on the degree to which the action 
interferes with investment-backed expectations for a property.136  By 
contrast, Nollan and Dolan place the onus on government to justify its 
decision to impose a condition on development that would otherwise 
result in a per se taking.137  Given these disparate burdens of proof, if 
monetary obligations that fall short of a physical taking may be 
analyzed under Nollan and Dolan, little incentive remains for a 
landowner to pursue compensation under Penn Central.  Recognizing 
that Nollan and Dolan do not apply to monetary obligations preserves 
the current landscape of takings claims, maintains the efficacy of 
Penn Central, and respects the distinction between physical and 
regulatory takings. 
Still, there remains a concern that “[a]d hoc individual monetary 
exactions deserve special judicial scrutiny” because they impose a 
burden on a specific landowner and evade the regular political process 
used to enact uniform development fees.138  To some extent, Nollan 
and Dolan alleviate this concern because they impose a higher burden 
on government to justify its actions than under the more deferential 
regulatory takings analysis.  Indeed, if a landowner cannot sustain a 
regulatory takings claim, most due process challenges will fail as a 
 
134 Yee, 503 U.S. at 522–23; see also supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
135 See West Linn IV, 349 Or. at 85–86, 240 P.3d at 44–45 (recognizing that both Penn 
Central and the total regulatory takings analysis apply to monetary obligations). 
136 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
137 Kent, supra note 2, at 1844. 
138 San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 105 (Cal. 
2002). 
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matter of course.139  But rather than further complicating the takings 
analysis, this valid suspicion of ad hoc development conditions may 
find an adequate and expedient remedy if courts apply a more 
rigorous rational basis inquiry when they review ad hoc monetary 
obligations imposed in exchange for the right to develop a specific 
property.140 
West Linn coheres functionally—if not neatly—with current 
federal exactions law.  It reflects the proposition that the exactions 
analysis does not apply to a monetary condition unless the condition 
amounts to a per se taking outside the exactions context.  Yet this 
approach places a burden on courts to assess the property interest at 
stake, and West Linn leaves undecided the proper means to determine 
whether an ad hoc development condition requires analysis under 
Nollan and Dolan. 
B.  Focusing on Burdens to Clarify Exactions 
To determine whether Nollan and Dolan apply to an ad hoc 
development condition, courts should first assess the specificity of the 
property interest burdened.  Both Phillips and Brown illustrate that 
the line between regulatory actions and per se takings is often blurred, 
and it defies any “clear distinction” between required monetary 
expenditures and dedications of physical property.141  And scholars 
continue to propose new tests to decide whether a condition imposed 
on development rights must comply with Nollan and Dolan.142  But 
rather than create further tests, the exactions analysis may find greater 
 
139 See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 
508 U.S. 602, 641 (1993) (“Given that [the] due process arguments are unavailing, ‘it 
would be surprising indeed to discover’ the challenged statute nonetheless violating the 
Takings Clause.” (quoting Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 223 
(1986))). 
140 Courts have sometimes employed a more probing rational basis review in other 
constitutional contexts.  See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 492 (2005) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (suggesting the use of a “meaningful rational-basis 
review” that affords greater scrutiny to certain government land use decisions); City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47 (1985) (endorsing heightened 
rational basis review where there exists “a bare . . . desire to a politically unpopular 
group”) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535 (1973))); see also Neelum 
J. Wadhani, Note, Rational Reviews, Irrational Results, 84 TEX. L. REV. 801 (2006). 
141 West Linn IV, 349 Or. 58, 85, 240 P.3d 29, 44 (2010). 
142 See, e.g., Kent, supra note 2, at 1876 (proposing a hybrid test “that combines the 
factor-balancing of Penn Central with the nexus and proportionality standards of 
Nollan/Dolan”). 
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clarity from a return to the fundamentals of the Takings Clause and 
renewed attention to the specific property interest burdened by 
government action.  This strategy finds a pragmatic articulation in the 
concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy in Eastern Enterprises v. 
Apfel.143 
Eastern Enterprises involved a tax on coal production assessed 
against certain coal producers that created a financial burden “as great 
[as] if the Government had appropriated” physical property.144  In a 
closely divided decision, four Justices held the tax unconstitutional as 
a taking under the Fifth Amendment.145  Justice Kennedy concurred 
in the judgment that the tax was unconstitutional but noted that the tax 
should be invalidated based on due process concerns.146  However, he 
opted not to classify the appropriations as the functional equivalent of 
a physical taking.147  Emphasizing the need to establish an “outer 
boundary for application of the regulatory takings rule,” Kennedy 
focused on the fact that the “character of the governmental action” did 
not impact any specific property interest.148  Although his 
observations came in the context of a regulatory takings challenge, 
the rationale behind his analysis offers two useful approaches for 
future courts to determine the scope and applicability of Nollan and 
Dolan. 
First, the analysis of exactions claims must focus initially on the 
specific property interest affected.  Neither new nor unprecedented,149 
this approach takes on heightened importance—and places a heavier 
burden on government to justify its actions—if Nollan and Dolan 
only apply to conditions on development that amount to a per se 
taking.  Some construe the exactions analysis to apply Nollan and 
 
143 See Reznick, supra note 4. 
144 E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 542 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in 
part). 
145 Id. at 538–39 (plurality opinion). 
146 Id. at 539 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part) (concluding 
that the offending provisions “must be invalidated as contrary to essential due process 
principles”). 
147 Id. at 542 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part).  The Court 
echoed this position in Lingle, where it emphasized the absurdity of requiring a district 
court to weigh the merits of opposing economic theories to decide takings claims.  Lingle 
v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 544–45 (2005). 
148 E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 542 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in 
part). 
149 Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910).  In a 
decision more than a century ago, Justice Holmes recognized that the operative inquiry in 
any takings claim is “what has the owner lost.”  Id. 
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Dolan to any condition imposed in exchange for a development right 
because the right to develop represents a specific property interest in 
itself.150  But that position conflates the development right granted 
with the conditions exacted in exchange for that right; Nollan and 
Dolan only apply to independently unconstitutional conditions 
imposed in exchange for a discretionary privilege.  Del Monte Dunes 
supports this view and makes clear that a mere denial of the right to 
develop does not amount to a deprivation of property sufficient to 
trigger Nollan and Dolan.151  Only if the imposed condition—
whether uniform or ad hoc—impacts a specific property interest 
should Nollan and Dolan apply.  Thus, the nature of the property 
interest impacted by government action provides the operative 
variable in the exactions equation. 
But in holding that Nollan and Dolan did not apply to the off-site 
improvements in West Linn, the Oregon Supreme Court focused 
instead on the governmental power invoked by the City to require the 
off-site improvements.152  Of course, the government may validly 
exact money from private parties through its taxing power, and the 
power under which a government body acts may justify adverse 
economic impacts.153  Yet any analysis of the power invoked by 
government to impose a development condition best applies after a 
court finds that the condition does not implicate a specific property 
interest and receive scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan. 
As the Oregon Supreme Court suggests, just compensation would 
be required as a matter of course for any government action that 
creates the functional equivalent of a physical taking, even if pursued 
under the guise of the government’s police power.154  Government-
imposed conditions on development that implicate a sufficiently 
specific property interest—such as the interest payments in Phillips 
and Brown—may also become a per se taking.  And Nollan and 
Dolan both reflect an underlying concern that government will use its 
regulatory authority to condition development rights on obligations 
 
150 See, e.g., Reznick, supra note 4, at 756; see also Siegel, supra note 4, at 589 
(discussing and disagreeing with the view of property rights advocates that Nollan and 
Dolan may still apply to ad hoc monetary obligations). 
151 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
152 West Linn IV, 349 Or. 58, 87, 240 P.3d 29, 45 (2010). 
153 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104, 124–25 (1978) (noting that the 
nature of the government power behind a regulation factors into the regulatory takings 
analysis). 
154 West Linn IV, 349 Or. at 86, 240 P.3d at 45. 
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“so onerous that, outside the exactions context, they would be deemed 
per se physical takings.”155  Given that a development condition may 
result in a per se taking regardless of the government power invoked, 
the specificity of the property interest implicated—rather than the 
power used to extract the condition—should dictate whether Nollan 
and Dolan apply. 
Second, courts should pay greater attention and offer more precise 
holdings in regards to the property interest implicated by a condition 
on development.  While differences may certainly exist between a 
monetary obligation and a paradigmatic physical taking of real 
property, not all monetary obligations “function” in the same way.  
For one, ad hoc monetary obligations required in exchange for 
development rights apply differently and may implicate more discrete 
property interests than uniformly applied development fees.156  And 
as noted above, both Brown and Phillips suggest that some forms of 
monetary obligation may amount to physical takings if they involve a 
discrete source of funds in the possession of a private party.157 
Thus, to assess whether the exactions analysis applies, it proves 
insufficient to conclude that a condition imposed on development 
amounts to the “functional equivalent” of a monetary obligation.158  
Rather, courts should focus on whether a condition imposed impacts a 
property interest—real or personal—specific enough that its seizure 
would otherwise constitute a physical taking.  If it does, Nollan and 
Dolan should apply; if not, a challenge remains to the regulatory 
action under Penn Central or the Due Process Clause. 
But ultimately, this approach would not change the outcome of the 
exactions claim in West Linn.  While the City required WLCP to 
make extensive improvements to public property, the obligations 
imposed on WLCP arguably did not implicate any discrete property 
interest.  For one, services rendered may carry some value, but unless 
highly specialized or based on unique expertise, they lack the 
“specificity” to amount to the functional equivalent of physical 
 
155 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005). 
156 The Oregon statute creating a statewide system development fee provides that the 
charge “does not include any fees assessed or collected as part of a local improvement 
district or a charge in lieu of a local improvement district assessment, or the cost of 
complying with requirements or conditions imposed upon a land use decision, expedited 
land division or limited land use decision.”  OR. REV. STAT. § 223.299(4)(b) (2009). 
157 See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
158 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539; Kent, supra note 2, at 1842. 
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property.159  Moreover, the future dedication of supplies to improve 
sewer lines and streets implicates a different and less specific property 
interest than the direct appropriation of presently held monetary 
funds.160  If an ad hoc condition on development rights does not 
amount to a direct physical taking, it finds no remedy under Nollan 
and Dolan and should proceed under a theory of regulatory takings or 
due process. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Oregon Supreme Court in West Linn offers a 
useful analysis of how the exactions analysis may apply to off-site 
conditions on development, yet its lasting effect and influence 
remains uncertain.  The decision also provides little guidance to 
future courts on how to determine whether the exactions analysis 
applies to a given development condition.  Yet Oregon is not alone in 
this regard.  Courts across the country struggle to determine whether 
and when to apply the exactions analysis to ad hoc development 
conditions.  As both development fees and ad hoc development 
conditions become increasingly common, courts must clarify the 
scope of the Nollan and Dolan analysis. 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in West Linn, 
the scope and nature of the exactions analysis still demand 
clarification.  Specifically, the exactions analysis should be confined 
to conditions that impact a property interest—whether real or 
personal—specific enough that its seizure constitutes a physical 
taking outside the exactions context.  This approach would provide a 
comprehensible standard for government bodies trying to develop 
land use strategies, guide landowners seeking to challenge 
development conditions, comport with the principles of Penn Central, 
and respect the distinction between physical and regulatory takings.  
 
159 In general, the U.S. Tax Code recognizes the inherent monetary value of goods and 
services.  See I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (2006); see also George James Bagnall, Comment, Notes of 
the 1991 Advisory Committee for the Amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45: 
Is the Compulsion to Testify of an Unretained Expert Witness a Taking?, 83 OR. L. REV. 
763, 766–73 (2004) (noting that whether compelled expert testimony constitutes a taking 
depends on the specialty of the testimony provided). 
160 West Linn IV, 349 Or. 58, 83, 240 P.3d 29, 43 (2010) (distinguishing “the imposition 
of a new monetary obligation from the acquisition of accrued interest on an existing 
account” at issue in Brown and Phillips (citing McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 
1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2008))). 
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Most importantly, it would bring some measure of clarity to federal 
exactions law. 
 
